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THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

After decades of restricted judicial interpretation, recent United
States Supreme Court decisions have revitalized the effectiveness of
the federal civil rights statutes enacted after the Civil War.' This note
examines one part of this judicial trend: the growth of the scope of
§ 1343(3),2 the jurisdictional counterpart of the descendant of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' The focus is on two key issues--one, the rights that are included within the scope of § 1343(3)
and two, how these rights must be "secured" by the Constitution
and/or federal statutes to invoke § 1343(3) jurisdiction.
The first issue is analyzed in light of Lynch v. Household Finance
Corporation,' in which the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the longstanding "property rights" exception to §
1343(3) jurisdiction. The second issue, still largely unclarified, is
emerging with the advent of lower federal court decisions finding
private causes of action based on alleged violations of federal statutes
regulating state-administered programs. While the main emphasis is
on § 1343(3) jurisdiction, other federal jurisdictional issues are discussed to the extent that they relate to the two key issues.
II.

THE RIGHTS INCLUDED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF

§ 1343 (3)

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Fi5 repudiated the long standing "property
nance Corporation
rights" ex1. See generally, Clark, The Lawyer in the Civil Rights Movement-A Catalytic
Agent or Counter-Revolutionary, 19 KAN. L. REV. 459 (1971).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3)
To redress the deprivation, under the color of any state law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the United States ....
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
5. Id.
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ception to § 1343(3) jurisdiction. This exception, also known as the
"property-personal right" distinction, originated in Mr. Justice Stone's
concurring opinion in Hague v. C.I.O.6 It proved to be increasingly
unworkable and was followed unevenly by the various circuits since
1939. 7 Mr. Justice Stone's widely quoted formulation of the distinction read:
[W]henever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not
dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property
rights, there is jurisdiction under [§ 1343(3)] of the Judicial Code
to entertain [a suit] without proof . . . [of an] amount in controversy .... s
The fact situation in Lynch is relatively simple: In February, 1968,
Mrs. Dorothy Lynch authorized her employer to deposit $10.00 of her
$69.00 weekly wage in a credit union savings account. Household
Finance Corporation sued Mrs. Lynch in a state court, alleging nonpayment of a promissory note. On June 23, 1969, pursuant to Connecticut statutes, in response to the order of the finance company's attorney, a deputy sheriff garnished Mrs. Lynch's account by serving a
writ of garnishment on the credit union. Three days later she was
served with process.
Similarly, in October, 1969, Mrs. Norma Toro, who earns $85.00
weekly, opened a checking account. Eugene Camposano, Mrs. Toro's
former landlord, sued her in state court for back rent allegedly due.
In a manner similar to that of Mrs. Lynch, Mrs. Toro's checking account was garnished on January 30, 1970. One day later Mrs. Toro
was served with process.
On March 4, 1970, Mrs. Lynch and Mrs. Toro, respectively, filed a
class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. In both actions, the plaintiffs alleged that they had received neither prior notice of the garnishments nor an opportunity to be
heard. They claimed that the state statutes were invalid under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the fourteenth amendment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Civil
6. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
7. See, Laufer, Hague v. C.I.O.: Mr. Justice Stone's Test of Federal JurisdictionA Reappraisal, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 547 (1970); Note, Section 1343 of Title 28-is
the Application of the "Civil Rights-Property Rights" Distinction to Deny Jurisdiction
Still Viable?, 49 B.U.L. REV. 377 (1969); Note, Civil Procedure: Section 1343(3) Jurisdiction and the Property-PersonalRight Distinction, 1970 DuKE L.J. 819; Note, The
"Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction--Confusion Compounded, 43
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1208 (1968); Note, Another and Hopefully Final Look at the PropertyPersonalLiberty Distinction of Section 1343(3), 24 VAND. L. REV. 990 (1971).
8. 307 U.S. at 531, 532.
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Because the plaintiffs sought an injunction

against the operation of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, a
special statutory district court of three judges was convened to hear and
determine the actions. 10
This three-judge court, in response to the defendant-creditors' motions, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints without an evidentiary hearing on October 22, 1970.1" The lower court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1343(3) and that relief was barred by the statute
prohibiting injunctions against state court proceedings.' 2
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's judgment, and remanded the case, holding "that neither § 1343
(3) nor § 2283 warranted dismissal of the appellant's complaint.""
In a unanimous decision' 4 the Court, through Mr. Justice Stewart,
ruled that the district court had jurisdiction under § 1343(3), expressly
rejecting the historic "property-personal right" distinction of Hague v.

C.I.O.1 5

At the onset of his opinion Justice Stewart noted that the Supreme
Court never adopted the Hague distinction.'
Furthermore, although
the Court had never before expressly rejected the distinction, Mr. Justice Stewart found it to be unsupported by both the literal meaning
of § 1343(3) and its legislative history. The direct lineal ancestor of
§§ 1983 and 1343(3) is § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.17 This
9. Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.
11. Mrs. Toro, the second appellant, had her garnishment released on March 24,
1970. The possible issue of mootness was not resolved by the lower court, in view of
its dismissal on the other grounds. Likewise, the Supreme Court did not reach the
mootness issue, treating garnishment of a checking and savings account identically.
405 U.S. at 540, n.2.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
13. 405 U.S. at 542.
14. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case. The Court divided 4-3 in finding that an injunction against the Connecticut garnishment statute is not barred by the terms of § 2283.
The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Stewart, reasoned that the state act in question was not
a proceeding "in state court" within the meaning of § 2283, since the Connecticut
garnishment can be instituted without judicial order. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall joined in the majority opinion, while Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. The dissenting opinion
did agree without reservation that § 1343(3) jurisdiction is not limited to the adjudication of personal rights, but differed on the § 2283 issue. Any further discussion of the § 2283 issue is beyond the scope of this note.
15. 405 U.S. at 542.
16. Id.
17. The original statute, 17 Stat. 13 read:
. . . any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
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section, in turn, was derived from § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and was passed for the express purpose of enforcing the fourteenth
amendment. Nothing in the legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to exclude property rights; in fact, the clear intention of the
enactment of § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act was to provide a federal judicial forum for the redress of wrongful deprivations of property

by persons acting under color of state law.'"
The Court's opinion also undermines the essential rationale behind the "property-personal rights" distinction-the notion that the general federal question provision,' 9 enacted by Congress in 1875, apparently conflicts with § 1343(3). Proponents of this rationale had
argued that a broad reading of §1343(3) to include all rights secured
by the Constitution would render § 1331, and its amount in controversy requirement superfluous. Mr. Justice Stone's opinion in the
Hague case had sought to harmonize the coexistence of the two jurisdictional provisions by construing § 1343(3) to confer federal jurisdiction only when the right asserted is personal, thus incapable of pecuniary valuation.
Lynch made short shrift of this notion by first observing that there
is no conflict between the two jurisdictional sections as § 1343(3) applies only to rights infringed "under color of state law," as opposed
to § 1331, which has no such restriction. Second, and more importantly, the Court found "no indication whatsoever" from the legislative
history of § 1331 that Congress intended to contract the scope of § 1
of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Applying the rule that repeal by implication is disfavored, the Court held that "§ 1983 and § 1343

must be given the meaning and sweep that their origins and their
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of
April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled An act to protect all persons in
the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication, and other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
For the subsequent legislative developments see Lynch, 405 U.S. at 543-46, n.7-11 and
also Herzer, Federal Welfare Jurisdiction, 6 HARVARD CIv. LIa.-Ctv. RIGHTS L. REV. 1,
4-9 (1970).
18. 405 U.S. at 543.
19. 18 Stat. 470. The present federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964)
provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States."
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language dictate.

'20

Finally, the Lynch opinion noted the practical impossibilities of distinguishing between property rights and personal rights:
Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal
liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not
have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or
the right to travel, is, in truth a "personal" right, whether the
"property" in question be a welfare check, a home or a savings
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between
the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property.
21
Neither could have meaning without the other.
Although the Lynch opinion stated that the Supreme Court never
adopted the "property-personal right" distinction of Hague, most of the
22
various circuit courts of appeals had in some fashion used it.
Thus, Lynch will eliminate the tortured methods some lower courts have
used to find § 1343(3) jurisdiction within the confines of the now
defunct distinction.13 Also, some plaintiffs will now have a federal
forum for adjudication of allegations of infringement of "property"
rights, where previously they were barred by some courts' overly strict
application of the Hague test.
In fact, the impact of Lynch is already apparent in some cases of
the October, 1971 term. The Supreme Court, consistent with the
Lynch decision, has found § 1343(3) jurisdiction in a number of cases
where deprivations of only property rights were alleged.
Three of these cases like Lynch, fall roughly into the category of
"consumer" suits: (1) Lindsey v. Normet24 involved a tenant's challenge to Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute; (2)
Swarb v. Lennox 25 involved a debtor's challenge to the Pennsylvania
statutory confession of judgment procedure; (3) Tucker v. Maher,26
20.

405 U.S. at 549.

21.
22.

Id. at 552.
See n.7, supra.

23. See, e.g., Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2nd
Cir. 1970) (right to be free from deprivation of property without procedural due
process is a civil right); Hall v. Garson, 438 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (suit challenging seizure of property pursuant to state statutory lien; right protected not property right, but right to privacy in the home). 405 U.S. at 551, n.19.
24. 405 U.S. 56.
25. 405 U.S. 191. See also Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971, judgment vacated
and remanded in light of Swarb v. Lennox.
26. 405 U.S. 1052, judgment vacated and remanded. (The lower court held no
§ 1343(3) jurisdiction since rights involved are "property" rights and not "personal" rights).
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like Lynch, involved a challenge to the Connecticut prejudgment attachment statute.
Two other cases that the Supreme Court has vacated and remanded
in light of Lynch concern other kinds of "property" rights. One
case, Garren v. City of Winston-Salem,27 involved a landowner's challenge to the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute giving municipalities extraterritorial zoning authority. Prior to Lynch, allegations
of infringement to pure property rights, such as allegations of diminution in property value caused by zoning, was considered outside the
Clearly, because of Lynch there will be more
scope of §1343(3) .s
federal litigation testing the constitutionality of zoning and other municipal decisions affecting real property uses.2 9
The second case, Lung v. Jones,30 illustrates two other aspects of
federal jurisdiction related to § 1343 (3). The Lung plaintiffs brought
a class action to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional collection of the
New Mexico state income tax. The district court, ruling there was no
federal jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs asserted two
grounds for jurisdiction: (1) general federal question jurisdiction
under § 1331 and (2) jurisdiction under § 1343(3).
For jurisdiction under § 1331 it is necessary that the matter in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000. None of the individual
plaintiffs in Lung asserted a claim for more than $10,000. However,
in their class action the plaintiffs contended by aggregating their individual claims the requisite jurisdictional amount was met. The lower
court refused to permit aggregation of claims, stating it was bound
by Snyder v. Harris,3 which held that claims of class members may
not be aggregated to arrive 'at the jurisdictional amount unless the action is a true class action 3 2 defined prior to the 1966 amendment to
Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A true class action requires
that the rights of the class members be common and undivided, arising
from a single right or title. The lower court held that the Lung suit
27. 405 U.S. 1052, judgment vacated and remanded.
28. Cf. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 329 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Texas 1971) (no
§ 1343(3) jurisdiction to enjoin state condemnation proceedings) (alternative holding).
29. See, e.g. Freilich and Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URBAN LAWYER 344 (1971); see also, Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of
the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (§ 1343(3) as
alternate ground for federal jurisdiction in suit challenging city council's refusal to rezone property intended to be used for low and moderate income housing development).
30. 322 F. Supp. 1069 (D.N.M. 1971), judgment vacated and remanded, 405 U.S.
1051 (1972).
31. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
32. 322 F. Supp. 1067, 1068.
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was not a true class action and the Supreme Court on appeal did not
disturb this part of the lower court's finding.
Without consideration of the state taxation issue, discussed next, the
Supreme Court's action in Lung illustrates how Lynch alleviates the
harsh effect of Snyder v. Harris,33 at least in cases arising under
§ 1983. 34 Hence, with "property" included within the scope of
§ 1343(3), which requires no jurisdictional amount, some plaintiffs
will get a federal forum, where they could not meet the jurisdictional
requirement of § 1331.
The district court in Lung also held there was no jurisdiction under § 1343(3) since it characterized the right allegedly infringed as a
"property" right. The court applied the Hague test-finding the
property right here outside the scope of § 1343(3) jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case in view
of Lynch.
Interestingly, the lower court in Lung apparently also based its denial of § 1343(3) jurisdiction on two Supreme Court cases involving
challenges to collection of state taxes. The two cases the lower court
cited- Hornbeak v. Harm3 5 and Abernathy v. Carpenter36-were also
cited in the Lynch opinion.37 In fact, the respondents in Lynch had
cited these two cases, among several, as authority for the proposition
that the Supreme Court had endorsed the concept that property rights
are excluded from the scope of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. The Lynch
Court disagreed with this interpretation of Abernathy and Hornbeak. Instead, the Court viewed these cases as reflecting the restriction of federal jurisdiction in suits seeking injunctions of state tax collection based on both statutory3 s and long-standing judicial policy.3 9
Thus, federal jurisdiction will still be denied in suits seeking to enjoin the collection of state taxes, but this lack of jurisdiction must be
based directly upon the congressional policy expressed in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341. Presumably on remand the lower court in Lung would hold
that the suit is barred by the terms of § 1341.
33. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
34. See, Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-based Welfare Claims, 6
HARV.Civ. LIB.-CIv. RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1970).
35. 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd. 393 U.S. 9 (1968).
36. 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), alternate holding, affd. 373 U.S. 241
(1963).
37. 405 U.S. 538, 542 n.6.

38.

28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, sus-

pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
39. See, Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932); See also, Note, The
"Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1208,

1212 (1968).
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INVOKING §1343 (3) JURISDICTION IN STATUTORILYBASED ACTION

Lynch by eliminating the "property-personal right" test has clarified
the scope of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. The question of how these
rights must be "secured" in order to invoke § 1343(3) jurisdiction is
as yet unanswered by the Supreme Court. Specifically, this issue may
be framed as whether it is necessary that plaintiffs allege violations of
the United States Constitution or whether it is enough that they
merely allege violations of federal statutes.4"
Whereas the "personal-property right" distinction had been widely
litigated and analyzed by many commentators4 1 before the clarification provided by Lynch, the question how these rights must be "secured" has been subject to little commentary 42 and only recently been
frequently litigated, probably most intensely in welfare rights cases.
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit case, Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service,4' and the cases adopting its rationale present substantial judicial support for the proposition that a civil rights"4 suit
may be brought and that § 1343 (3) jurisdiction lies in statutorily-based
claims.
A major obstacle to obtaining § 1343(3) jurisdiction in statutorilybased claims is the difference in the language between § 1983 and
§ 1343(3). While the former provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights "secured" by federal "laws", the parallel part of the
latter reads "secured . . . by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights. 1 5 Apparently, this literal difference caused the Second Circuit to hold that § 1343(3) jurisdiction will lie only when there is
an allegation of deprivation of substantial constitutional rights. 6 On
40. A related issue, assuming that claims based on federal statutes alone are
insufficient, is whether § 1343(3) requires "substantial" constitutional claims, as opposed to "colorable" constitutional claims. See, e.g., Carter v. Like, 448 F.2d 798,
801 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972) (concluded that where colorable constitutional claims are raised federal jurisdiction will lie); cf., Almenares v.
Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1082 (2nd Cir. 1971) (requires substantial constitutional

claims).

41. See, note 7, supra.
42. See, Herzer, supra, note 17; Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Feb.-March 1969, at 5.; Note,
Federal JudicialReview of Welfare Practices,67 COL. LAW REV. 84, 109-15 (1967).
43. 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. See, note 3,supra.
45. Emphasis added.
46. Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1082 and n.9 (essential that substantial

constitutional claim be presented as Social Security Act is not an "Act of Congress
providing for equal rights . . ." under § 1343(3)); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246
(2nd Cir. 1969); Rosado v.Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2nd Cir. 1969).

366

1972

Federal Civil Rights Jurisdiction

the other hand, some courts, particularly the Fifth Circuit, have disregarded this difference of wording and find federal jurisdiction for statutorily-based claims.
To ascertain the real meaning of these statutes, like any statute, it
is necessary to analyze legislative history, policy considerations behind
their enactment, and, their meaning as expressed in judicial decisions.
An examination of these considerations casts doubt on the notion that
the difference of language between the two sections is critical.
The legislative history of § 1983 and § 1343(3) has been traced by
the Supreme Court, most recently in Lynch,4 7 and has been thoroughly discussed in earlier commentaries.4" These two sections are the
direct descendants of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871."9 In
the Revised Statutes of 1875 Congress enlarged the scope of the substantive provision to protect rights secured by federal law as well as
rights secured by the Constitution."° This substantive provision became § 1979, separated from its jurisdictional counterparts: § 563
(12) providing for district court jurisdiction was identical in scope to
§ 1979; while § 629(16) providing for circuit court jurisdiction was
restricted in scope to statutory claims "secured . . . by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights."
The 1911 Congress in the
process of abolishing orginal jurisdiction in the circuit courts merged
the two jurisdictional sections into what is now § 1343(3). 5' The
merged section retained the "equal rights" restriction of § 629(16).
This difference in language causes no difficulty when the substantive
claim of the suit alleges a constitutional violation. In that instance
§ 1343(3) clearly provides federal jurisdiction. However, the lower
courts have divided on the jurisdictional question when statutorilybased claims only are asserted in § 1983 suits. To date, the Supreme
Court has found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict. The cases
in which this issue may have been presented to the Court have followed
,apattern typified by King v. Smith.52
Although initially, the plaintiff in King raised a constitutional
challenge to a state welfare regulation, eventually the Supreme Court
struck down the regulation on statutory grounds-i.e. the federal stat47. 405 U.S. 538, 543-48 and nn.7-15.
48. See, e.g., Herzer, note 17 supra, 4-9; Federal Judicial Review of Welfare Practices, supra note 42, 111-15.
49. See, note 17, supra.
50. 405 U.S. 538, 548, n.15.
51. Act of March 3, 1911, c.231, 36 Stat. 1087.
52. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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ute under which the state welfare program was administered prohibited the state regulation in question. The pattern established in
King v. Smith, and followed in subsequent welfare rights litigation,5"
consists of (1) finding, without significant discussion, § 1343(3) jurisdiction where deprivation of constitutional rights (denial of due
process and equal protection) is alleged; and (2) a decision of the
substantive issues of the case on statutory grounds rather than constitu54
tional grounds.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts
have disagreed on the issue of whether § 1343(3) jurisdiction is conferred in statutorily-based suits. Until the advent of welfare rights litigation, there were relatively few § 1983 suits brought on the basis of
violation of federal statutes. In one of these cases, Bomar v. Keyes,55
the difference in language between § 1983 and § 1343(3) apparently
was not crucial. The Second Circuit, through Judge Learned Hand,
held that a "probationary" teacher could bring a suit in the federal
courts against her public school employer. She alleged that she was
fired because she missed work while on federal jury duty. Judge
Hand, in finding federal jurisdiction, did not even mention § 1343(3),
but rather, found that the federal jury statute conferred a "privilege"
within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. 6 On the other hand, the
53. E.g., Shapiro v. Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (1969) (per curiam affirmance of decision
invalidating a state "man in the house" rule); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (held violation of due process where benefits terminated without a hearing);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection challenge
to a maximum on AFDC benefits to a family unit); Rodriguez v. Swank, 403 U.S. 901
(1971) (summarily affirming lower courts' denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiffs
alleged delay in receipt of benefits); Townsend v, Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (invalidating state regulation allowing AFDC payments for students 18 to 21 years oldin vocational schools, but denying payments for students in colleges).
54. For example, the appellants in Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972) brought
a § 1983 action challenging an Indiana welfare regulation. The three-judge district
court dismissed the suit holding no substantial constitutional question was presented.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiarn opinion, held the lower court erred and remanded
the case for decision on the merits. The Court also found error in the lower
court's holding that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative
remedies. The Indiana regulation in question "provides that a person who seeks assistance due to separation or the desertion of a spouse is not entitled to aid until the
spouse has been continuously absent for at least six months, unless there are exceptional circumstances of need" 405 U.S. at 670. The Court then cited Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 971 (1970) (levels of welfare assistance); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residency requirement); and Daico v. California,
389 U.S. 416 (1967) (provision which did not allow aid to a child until his parents
had been separated for three months, etc.) as cases presenting a substantial constitutional question. This case-by-case approach of deciding what is a substantial constitutional question for purposes of § 1343(3) yields no usable standards for possible
future cases.
55. 162 F.2d 136 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); see Note,
The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 1285, 1291-93 (1953).
56. Id. at 138.
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Ninth Circuit interpreted the difference in language between § 1983
and § 1343(3) as excluding federal jurisdiction in statutorily-based
57
suits.
Presently, there are two court of appeals decisions, McCall v. Shapira 8 and Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service,59 which
illustrate the conflicting views on federal jurisdiction where only statutorily-based claims are asserted.
The Second Circuit in McCall v. Shapiro refused to find § 1343(3)
jurisdiction where only violations of the Social Security Act were pressed
on appeal. The court reasoned that the scope of § 1343(3) was
less than that of § 1983, citing the difference in language, and concluded there was no legislative intent to provide § 1343(3) jurisdiction in all § 1983 cases. 60 However, because the McCall court relied on the "property-personal right" distinction of Hague, its view of
the legislative intent is questionable. Essentially, the McCall court
observed that in enacting welfare statutes Congress had not specifically provided for their enforcement in federal courts. Applying the
Hague test, it held that § 1343(3) jurisdiction did not lie in suits involving money claims not related to a violation of civil rights.6 1 The
court added:
It is reasonably clear then that Section 1343(3) . . . dealing
with statutes providing for "equal rights" . . is aimed at questions
of personal liberty rather than property matters, and that the
latter are relegated to the general provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(a).62

In view of the Lynch decision, a conclusion opposite to McCall
seems more plausible-that there is no indication that Congress, in
57. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158
(9th Cir. 1950) (no jurisdiction where suit brought under Social Security and National Labor Relations Act, alternate holding); see also McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F.

Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951)
which
58.
59.
60.

(Federal Communications Act not an "Act of Congress

creates equal rights").
416 F.2d 246 (2nd Cir. 1969).
417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
416 F.2d 246, 250 (2nd Cir. 1969).

The court also rejected the argument

that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964), which provides for
original jurisdiction: "To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right

to vote."
61. Id. The Second Circuit softened the effects of this decision in Johnson v.
Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (2nd Cir. 1971), a case where the constitutional claim was asserted on appeal. The court circumvented the Hague test for welfare cases. There,
the court held that the right to receive welfare payments, although a monetary claim,
was a "personal" right-some sort of right to exist in society. In view of Lynch
this kind of judicial maneuvering is unnecessary.
62. Id. The Second Circuit followed McCall in Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d
1075, 1082 and n.9. Accord, Acosta v. Swank, 325 F. Supp. 1157 (N.D. 111. 1971).
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revising the statutes, intended to make the scope of §1343(3) narrower
thanthatof § 1983.68
In contrast to McCall, the Fifth Circuit in deciding Gomez v.
Florida State Employment Service64 found federal jurisdiction where
only statutorily-based claims were asserted. The claims were based
on the Wagner-Peyser Act of 193-365 and the regulations6 6 promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. The plaintiffs, migrant workers,
brought an action based on violations of the statute and regulations.
The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding jurisdiction under § 1343(4) to
hear a § 1983 suit based on the Wagner-Peyser Act.67 The Gomez
court did not determine that the statute in question was an "Act of
Congress providing for equal rights," nor did it deal with the open
question of King v. Smith." The court reasoned:
We need not do this since § 1343(4) does provide jurisdiction
for all claims stated under § 1983, although operating as a conduit through which other statutory rights are protected, is itself
'69
an "Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights."
Since Gomez, other courts have found federal jurisdiction in suits
alleging a violation of federal statutes. For example, Ayala v. District
60 School Board of Pueblo, Colorado70 involved a challenge, on equal
protection grounds, to the administration of an elementary school lunch
program. Invoking pendent jurisdiction, the court held it had jurisdiction to hear a claim under the National School Lunch Act. 7 ' Further, the court hinted that it might have "original jurisdiction of the statutory claim as a federal law within the meaning of § 1983.' '72 The recent wave of litigation challenging reductions by states in their Medicaid programs 73 has also shown that the federal courts will entertain
claims based on federal statutes-here, the Medicaid statute enacted
63. See, Note, Review of Welfare Practices, supra, note 42, at 113. Cover, supra
note 42.
64. 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 49 et seq. (1964).
66. 20 C.F.R. § 602.9.
67. 417 F.2d at 580. The court also found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337

(1964):

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or

proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade

or commerce against restraints and monopolies."
68.
69.

417 F.2d at 580 n.39.
417 F.2d at 580.

71.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1751 et seq. (1964).

70.

See also note 52, supra, and accompanying text.

327 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1971).

72. 327 F. Supp. at 982.
73.

See, Blang and Butler, Developments in Medicaid Cutback Remedies, 5

ING HousE REv.
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723 (1972).

CLEAR-

1972

Federal Civil Rights Jurisdiction

in 1965.14 In one of the suits, Bass v. Rockefeller,7 5 the court,
while finding jurisdiction under the general federal question provision,
stated in a footnote that it would also probably find jurisdiction under
76
§ 1343(3) following the Gomez approach.
The Hill-Burton Act,7 7 which provides for federal grants of funds to
states and private parties to build or modernize hospital facilities has
provided the statutory basis for four suits recently filed in the federal
courts. 78 Significantly, all of the district court decisions except one,
held that private suits could be based on the section of the statute
which provides, inter alia, "there will be made available in the facility
a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor.

.

.

Euresti v. Stenner, s0 the one district court decision holding that no
action could lie under the Hill-Burton Act, was overturned by the
Tenth Circuit, which remanded the case for trial. The decision of the
Tenth Circuit in Euresti and the other district court cases have followed the lead of Gomez in holding that a private cause of action
can be based on a federal statute. Generally, these cases did not
discuss the federal jurisdictional issue. 8 '
In Euresti, the Tenth Circuit (through Mr. Justice Clark) did
not even mention the federal jurisdictional basis, even though it was
reversing the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The
court simply found (1) that in receiving the federal funds, the appellee-defendants obligated themselves to provide a reasonable amount
of health care; 2 (2) that the plaintiffs as the intended beneficiaries
of this obligation had standing to sue;8 3 and (3) that § 291(m)
of the Hill-Burton Act is not a bar to enforcement of these obligations.8 4 Additionally, the court did cite Gomez in discussing the
standing issue.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a), (d).
75. 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
76. 331 F. Supp. at 949, n.5.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1964).
78. See, Organized Mis. in Com. Act. v. Archer, 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Cook v. Ochsner, 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970); Perry v. Greater Southeastern Community Hospital Foundation, Inc., No. 725-71 (D.D.C. 1971) (§ 1331
jurisdiction); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 291(e).

80.

81.
tioned
82.
83.
84.

Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).

In O.M.I.C.A. v. Archer, 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971), the court menthat the jurisdiction was asserted under § 1331 or § 1343.
458 F.2d 1117.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
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While the impact of Euresti is difficult to assess due to the Tenth
Circuit's failure to discuss jurisdiction, 5 the presumed finding of jurisdiction illustrates the progress plaintiffs are making in obtaining judicial enforcement of federal statutorily-based claims.
CONCLUSION

Lynch v. Household Finance has largely clarified the issue of what
rights are within the scope of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. No longer will
courts have to use tortured methods to find federal jurisdiction when
traditional "property" rights are allegedly infringed. The real significance of Lynch's abolition of the "personal-property right" distinction is the resulting increased accessibility of federal courts. This is further illustrated by the Euresti decision wherein federal jurisdiction was
found based only on an alleged violation of a federal statute. This
trend toward increased accessibility will at last permit judicial interpretation of the federal civil rights acts to the full extent contemplated by
Congress.
EDWIN

R. MCCULLOUGH

85. Substantively, however, Euresti's impact has been direct and immediate. In the
wake of these Hill-Burton suits the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued regulations for some 6,308 health care institutions that receive the federal construction funds. The regulations order the hospitals to provide some level of health care
to persons unable to pay. New York Times, § 4, p. 4, April 23, 1972.

372

